Much of the offseason chatter around the SEC centered on how the legendary Monte Kiffin, now the defensive coordinator for the University of Tennessee under his son, Lane, would deal with the extremely productive but decidedly “college” (in a good way) Florida Gator spread offense, orchestrated and designed by Urban Meyer.
And, while the game itself, a 23-13 affair, was quite possibly a snoozer, the ennui that has followed the game has been remarkable. The storylines have swirled: Tebow’s passing was questionable, Meyer says that he put the brakes on because Lane Kiffin wasn’t interested in winning, and he mentioned that his team was flu-stricken. Yet there is no overshadowing that Monte’s defense did a nice job against Florida’s offense. His plan was to take away the inside run game and make the receivers beat them. And, indeed, the subtext of Meyer’s post-game comments indicate that Monte’s plan was pretty much on target:
“You don’t have to be a genius to figure out the strength of our team right now,” Meyer said. “And that’s a big offensive line running off the ball and a freak quarterback that just takes the game over.
“Is it perfect? No, it’s not perfect. But until we get the full allotment, the full compliment, of wide receivers playing at the level we need them to play, we’ve got to do what we’ve got to do to win.”
So what was Monte’s plan? A few bullets:
- The basic theory was clear: focus on Florida “inside to out,” meaning focus first on the line and the gamebreaking runningbacks, then on Tebow running and the inside receivers and tight-ends like Hernandez, and, only last, Florida’s outside receivers. I had predicted Monte might do this, but I was wrong with his prescription. I had said they might plan man and use Berry as a “rover” like Dungy used Bob Sanders. I was wrong: Monte played zone defense almost exclusively, played his cornerbacks way off usually to help deep inside, while the other nine guys — Eric Berry included — all kept their eyes in the backfield. And this is why Monte gets the big bucks: this was better than what I had suggested.
- For example, Kiffin played a lot of Cover 4 or “quarters” against Florida. Florida, in turn, uses a lot of “trips” sets with three receivers to a side to try to force them out of it. The defensive adjustment is to have the safety to the single-receiver side cheat over and help with the inside slot. The diagram below shows this, though I admit it looks a little confusing. The point is that the safeties help with bracketing coverage but also fly up for run support; both guys can hit people on the line of scrimmage.
- Where are the weaknesses? To the outside receivers. The single receiver backside is basically in one-on-one coverage because the safety to his side has cheated over for trips. Yet Tebow could not get the ball outside.
- And when he tried, the Gators looked awful. Tebow was 14-19 for 115 yards and an interception, and also took a couple of sacks. First, Monte was able to make Florida’s line look poor with a lot of stunts and occasional blitzes, though he never brought an all-out one. Frequently, Tebow had very little time to go through his reads.
- But even when he did, he looked off-kilter. The interception he threw to Eric Berry was a prime example. Kiffin changed up his coverage to what was (I believe, the camera angles were not great) an “invert Cover two” where instead of two deep safeties, a safety and the cornerback played deep. Yet this wasn’t heavily disguised: Eric Berry just sat in the flat. Tebow stared at him, and stared at him, and stared at him…and then threw him the ball. (Senior?!) Anyway Kiffin was mixing up the schemes well, but again the common theme was zone with pressure on Tebow to get him rattled.
- Below is video of the pick; it should begin at the proper point. If not, skip ahead to the 0:50 mark.
- Of course, take away the Gators passing game and you still have to deal with their strength, the run game. Again however, the zone Kiffin played was very effective because zone defenders, unlike man ones, get to look into the backfield on every play, and can therefore react quickly to the run. So much of the game Kiffin stayed in his base 4-3 looks with one or two safeties, and played aggressive.
- But there was one adjustment which was very interesting, and that was Monte’s move on first downs and short yardage — basically any obvious running down — to a 5-2 “double eagle” look. I don’t know what personnel Monte was using exactly, but instead of the base 4-3 he went to a nose guard, two defensive linemen in “three techniques” (outside eye of the offensive guards) and then two stand-up types in “five techniques” (outside eye of the tackles). Two linebackers roamed behind them. See the image below, and apologies for the very low quality.
- Why do this? It’s a move Pete Carroll uses a lot at USC, but is particularly effective against a spread set without a tight-end. It’s a numbers issue: the defense “covers” every person on the offensive line (the five line guys, or three down linemen and two stand-up guys), while both possible ballcarriers — the runningback and quarterback — have defensive counterparts, i.e. the two inside linebackers. Now a few times they went to this Florida was still able to bull for a short first down, but that’s just line movement as much as anything else. But it was no doubt effective as it helped keep Florida in check most of the game. Again, Monte dialed this up on first down too, which again called into question how dependable Florida’s outside receivers were.
- But of course, Tebow being Tebow, found a way to win. He was helped by some late game adjustments Meyer called in. For starters, when Florida went to its read plays it was clear that Tennessee preferred to keep the ball in Tebow’s hands. This is not as irrational as it sounds: a carry by Rainey or Demps is a touchdown, whereas Tebow just bludgeons you for positive yards. The problem was that the Kiffins assumed that Tebow would eventually wear down, which is something that does not actually happen.
- Meyer called for the veer option, where the quarterback and runningback read a playside defender rather than a backside defender as with the zone read. This lets the offense get more double teams at the point of attack. But they made a nice adjustment: they didn’t really run it as the true “veer,” where you read the defensive end (five technique). Instead they ran the “midline” — they read the defensive tackle. A couple diagrams will (hopefully) better illustrate this. (See here for some “midline” info from a true flexbone look.)
- This is not the true, true midline because there is only one read and from the gun the mechanics are different, but it is an effective move. Remember that the old option adage applies to the spread offense too: if you can’t block him, read him. Florida went to this play several times late in the game and the read man, the three technique defensive tackle, took the runningback and Tebow stepped around for big gainers.
In the end, Tennessee had an excellent plan, but Florida had enough juice with its powerful line and powerful quarterback. And Urban Meyer is right that Tennessee does not really lack talent on defense. I don’t necessarily buy his argument that they throttled the offense back. Maybe they could have been more aggressive but the passing game had been very shaky, and in the second half it was all read plays and options for the most part as UT had bottled up the basic zones and powers. It’s not clear whether this is a blueprint for future teams or just an example of an off game for Tebow with a fired up Tennessee defense (and a mediocre Tennessee offense not worth the risk?), or if, with Florida’s personnel weaknesses at receiver, we will see these schemes repeated.
And let me conclude by just saying this. I think these schemes were important, but Monte Kiffin coaches a disciplined defense. His defenders tackle well, fly to the ball, read their keys properly, and take good pursuit angles. If you do those things, you will have a good defense, no matter the scheme.